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Nigerian Echoes of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
I never thought I would travel to Tel Aviv 
by motorcycle, but somehow I found my-
self on the back of a bike on my way to 
an interview there—not in Israel, but in 
Nigeria. I was in Kaduna, once the capital 
of the Northern region. Famously known 
as the “liberal city” and one of the few 
cities in the North where Muslims and 
Christians could live side by side, after 
the 2000 and 2002 riots Kaduna became 
increasingly ethnically and religiously 
segregated. More surprising than the spatial expression of these ten-
sions are the imported terms, maps, and metaphors deployed to ar-
ticulate them.1
One mostly Christian neighbourhood, previously called “Television” 
now sometimes bears the nickname “Tel Aviv,” and Kaduna South, 
(also mostly Christian) “New Jerusalem.” Correspondingly, the Mus-
lim neighbourhood of Rigasa is now sometimes called “Palestine.” But 
these parallel terms for neighbourhoods do not just represent the well-
known Nigerian flair for humorous renaming. While the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict is not a significant factor in internal Nigerian politics, Chris-
tian and Muslim activists do sometimes articulate local politics in the 
borrowed lexicon of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Regional foreign orientations
Yet, religious divisions in Nigeria—and their linkages to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict—have a long history dating to the early days of 
independence in the 1960’s when the country was divided into three 
autonomous regions: North, East, and West. These regions roughly cor-
responded to the three main ethnic groups of the country: the largely 
Muslim Hausa/Fulani in the North, the mostly 
Catholic Ibo in the East, and mixed Muslim and 
Christian Yoruba in the West. From independence 
in 1960 until the creation of states in 1967, each 
region had a large degree of autonomy including 
international affairs.
A particular bone of contention was Nigeria’s 
relationship with the Muslim World and Israel. 
During the First Republic, Ahmadu Bello, Pre-
mier of the Northern Region had a close personal 
friendship with King Faisal, and became the Vice 
President of the World Muslim League in 1963. As 
an outgrowth of this role, Premier Bello also op-
posed economic agreements between Nigeria 
and Israel in 1961-1962. Yet, by 1964, this stance 
softened, with the Premier meeting the Israeli Ambassador. In contrast, 
the predominately Ibo region of the East had consistently extremely 
strong economic ties with Israel, with many companies operating in 
both manufacturing and agriculture.
The strong Ibo-Israeli ties have also been explained by referring to 
the locally popular idea that the Ibo are descended from the Israelites.2 
Given Israeli investment in the East and theories of the Judean origin 
of the Ibos, there have long been rumours of official Israeli support to 
the secessionist movement of Biafra, particularly during the civil war 
(1967-1970). Although General Ojukwu, Biafra’s leader, flatly dismissed 
reports of Israeli governmental support, he explained that a small 
number of Israeli individuals with business interests in the Eastern 
region acted as intermediaries for arms acquisition and humanitarian 
aid.3
Unsurprisingly, Ojukwu placed this in a context of a “natural affinity.” 
Ojukwu also maintained that the Ibo were likewise an “oppressed peo-
ple that suffered genocide.” Many of the tropes deployed in the Biafran 
propaganda war echoed those de-
ployed by Israel’s international cam-
paign during the 1967 war, includ-
ing the David and Goliath metaphor 
coupled with heavy use of references 
to “jihad.” Ojukwu explained his de-
liberate and repeated use of the term 
“pogrom” in Biafran propaganda stat-
ing “one thing that will wake up Euro-
peans is to see the type of massacre 
that happened to the Jews.”
This balancing act between contending foreign policy orientations 
remained even after the regions were abolished. In October 1973, Ni-
geria cut diplomatic relations with Israel in response to OAU (Organi-
zation of African Unity) positions on the issue and the October 1973 
war. A decade later, Gen. Babangida made Nigeria a member in the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1985. This surprise move 
caused tremendous controversy and is often cited as a cause of a rise in 
Muslim-Christian tensions in the late 1980’s. In what is commonly por-
trayed as a compromise between the two communities in advance of 
the 1993 elections, Babangida reinitiated diplomatic relations with Is-
rael in 1992. Although the actual motives behind these decisions taken 
under military rule may never be clear, what is well-understood is that 
both communities view recognition of Israel as a Christian counter-
point to OIC membership. But why would Israel be seen as a Christian 
country? When I asked this question to Christians, I was told repeatedly 
that Israel is a Christian country. Samuel Salifu, Secretary General of 
the Christian Association of Nigeria, explained it this way, “The average 
Christian does not understand the details. Israel is the country from 
which Christ sprang…The way Christians feel about Israel is the way 
Muslims feel about Mecca.”
Politics of pilgrimage
And this statement is not surprising. The Nigerian government pro-
vides a degree of public support for individual pilgrimages—not only 
to Mecca, but also to Jerusalem. Even though there is no Christian re-
ligious duty of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, it has become an established 
state-sponsored Christian activity in Nigeria as a response to state 
support for the Hajj. The practice has become so institutionalized that 
Christians who have gone on pilgrimage are given actual “JP certifi-
cates” which gives them the ability to claim the honorific title “Jerusa-
lem Pilgrim” as do Muslims “Hajji.”
Christian Pilgrims’ Welfare Boards in all states administer governmen-
tal sponsorship of pilgrims to Christian Holy Lands. In doing so, they co-
ordinate their activities with the Israeli government and hire Israeli tour 
companies, who then map the ideological and physical boundaries of 
the “Holy Land” for Nigerian pilgrims. The packages include overnight 
stays on kibbutzes and “Bible quizzes” in which Israeli-Nigerian flag-
pins are the prize. While pilgrims visit the Western Wall in order to write 
their prayers and insert them so that they will be answered, al-Aqsa and 
the Dome of the Rock are not included.
Not only do these itineraries draw lines inclusively with Israeli culture 
and exclusively of Muslim heritage, but the Green Line itself is often 
distorted on pilgrimages as well. One itinerary boasts of boat trips from 
the Sea of Galilee to Kibbutzes in the Golan Heights, portrayed as if 
located in Israel. The next day, from the Golan the group “drive(s) south-
wards through the Jordan Valley to Jericho, the most ancient city in the 
world” after which pilgrims also take in some shopping at the AHAVA 
plant on the shores of the Dead Sea on their way back to Eilat.4 Men-
tion of border crossings comes only during the Mt. Sinai portion of the 
excursion, when pilgrims “commit ourselves into the hands of our Lord 
before setting out for the Egyptian border at Taba.” After this overnight 
Although resonances of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict are unexpected in Nigeria, in various 
ways political actors in Nigeria borrow tropes 
from the remote conflict to articulate local 
politics. Relatively autonomous foreign policies 
of the regions in the early independence period 
set the stage for contending orientations 
toward the Middle East, but imported concepts 
have more recently been deployed in Muslim 
and Christian politics.  
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sojourn in Arab lands, “we set off again 
and drive back to the ‘Promised Land.’”
One critic of Christian support for 
Israel, Joseph Hayap, Secretary of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria, Ka-
duna State, challenges this perspec-
tive and attributes his alternative 
view to increased exposure to areas 
outside of Israeli control. Of Palestin-
ians, he states: “They have even more 
Christians in Bethlehem than Muslims. 
A good number of churches are there 
and they actually worship. I have been 
there many times, five or six times.” And 
this has shaped his view: “We have lost 
so many churches…so many pastors 
have been killed just because Israel 
starts bombing…I say no. The problem 
with Israel is not a religious problem…
The issue between Israel and Palestine 
is purely a political issue.” When asked 
why Christians from various commu-
nities in Nigeria view it as a religious 
issue, he replied: “They think that way 
because they know that Muslims think 
that way too. Any day Israel strikes 
Palestine, assume it’s a Christian war 
against Islam.”5
Al-Quds in Kano
As for the Christians, Jerusalem is also a focal point for Muslim mo-
bilization on the conflict. Christian Nigerians go to Jerusalem, but Je-
rusalem comes to Muslims in Nigeria through the form of al-Quds day 
(the Arabic name for Jerusalem). Although Muslim (and non-Muslim)6 
solidarity with the plight of the Palestinian people is neither uncom-
mon nor particularly noteworthy in and of itself, the observance of al-
Quds day is a unique practice, most prevalent in Shia areas such as Iran 
and Lebanon. Because Nigeria’s Muslim population is largely Sunni, the 
observance of al-Quds day in Kano and other cities of the north is quite 
unexpected. One of the Nigerian Muslim activists most popularly as-
sociated with this phenomenon is Ibraheem Zakzaky. 
Then a student at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria and Vice Presi-
dent (International) of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN), 
Zakzaky travelled to Iran on the one-year anniversary celebration of 
the Iranian Revolution. Like the rest of the Muslim population of Ni-
geria, Zakzaky was Sunni but deeply impressed with the political and 
social transformation in Shia Iran. Upon his return he delivered a series 
of lectures. During one key lecture Zakzaky spoke about the revolution, 
recounting his meeting with Imam Khomeini. Students poured into the 
streets and demonstrated in Zaria painting graffiti saying “Islam only.” 
As Zakzaky’s support grew, he left the MSSN and began a movement, 
called the Ikhwan, inspired by the success of Iranian students.
Because of its association with Iran, the movement has been called 
“Shia” a designation to be understood in the context of tensions be-
tween sects in Northern Nigeria. Zakzaky himself offers the name 
“Ikhwan” and hesitates to use the term Shia at all despite observing 
Ashura and other Shia rituals, saying “Here people give Shia different 
meanings, so we try to avoid it…since we all understand that we are 
Muslims.” Although this statement is clearly tied to Nigerian politics 
which have seen extensive intra-Muslim divisions, it can also be read 
as a caution against growing Sunni-Shia sectarian strife in the Muslim 
World, about which Zakzaky has written and spoken extensively.
Although small in number and based primarily in Zaria with a scat-
tered presence elsewhere in the North, the observances of the Ikhwan 
are a good example of transplanted practices. Since the early 1980’s, 
Zakzaky as well as many of his followers have studied in Qom and he 
himself has travelled several times to Lebanon for conferences. Through 
Zakzaky, the route from al-Quds to Kano thus goes through Qom. The 
mission statement of al-Quds day on the Ikhwan website states: “Today 
being 25th of Ramadan is the last Friday of the holy month, and as des-
ignated by Imam Khomaini of bless [sic] memory, is the International 
Quds Day in which we come out en masse commemorating the flight 
of Muslims in Palestine and the oppressed globally…It is a day set aside 
for reminding the world the significance of the holy Al-Aqsa mosque in 
Jerusalem and it’s desecration perpetrated by the Zionists usurpers for 
decades, by staging peaceful marches, making speeches and distribut-
ing releases.” 
Keenly aware of the sometimes less than benign interest in global 
activist networks, Zakzaky is quick to place the role of travel and ed-
ucation in perspective. In doing so, he quotes the Hausa expression 
“tafiyya mabudin ilimi” or “travel is the key to knowledge.” And it is clear 
that while exposure to the perspectives of Shia Muslims shaped the 
expression and particular practice of solidarity, solidarity itself does not 
emerge from it. Zakzaky states: “Times without number, our ideas did 
not change because of travels…We thought these things in the late 
1970’s…we are just as you knew us in the late 1970’s, even before the 
Iranian Revolution.”
In Nigeria, the metaphors have been transport-
ed and transformed from the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Ibo activists who believe they are a lost 
tribe of Israel invoked the language of “pogrom” 
to garner international support. Aspiring “Jeru-
salem Pilgrims” travel to the “Holy Land” whose 
physical and ideational boundaries are carefully 
mapped by Israeli travel agents. Likewise, while 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause is not uncom-
mon among movements around the world, the 
Shia inspired Ikhwan movement has introduced a 
unique form of practice in pro-Palestinian solidar-
ity. Yet, these transnational transactions are nei-
ther provisions of material support nor tentacles 
through which Israel and Iran influence Nigerian 
politics through Christian-Muslim competition. 
However, these metaphorical borrowings by Ni-
gerian Christian and Muslim actors have shaped 
some of the discursive terrain of intra-group rela-
tions and group identity in Nigeria.
Notes
1. The author would like to thank Dr John 
Paden and Dr Brian Larkin for their 
comments on previous drafts. 
2. N. T. Ogbukagu, The Ibo and the Riddles of 
their Jewish Origin (Enugu: Okike Printing, 
2001); Chief Eric C. N. Okam, The Ibo as 
Descendents of Jacob (Enugu: Snaap, 2004); 
and Uchechukwu Ikanyibe, Biblical Evidences: 
Confirming the Hebrew Origin of the Igbo 
People (Benin: Peculiar Heritage, 1999).
3. Interview, General C. Odemdgwu Ojukwu, 
29 September 2006, Enugu. 
4. “Day-by-day itinerary” 05-15 March 2006, 
obtained from the office of one of the 
Christian Pilgrim’s Welfare Board in a state in 
northern Nigeria. 
5. Interview, Joseph Hayap, 17 July 2006, 
Kaduna.
6. During a trip to Belfast during Summer 2002, 
it was difficult not to notice that Catholic-
Protestant competition had taken on a new 
dimension: Republican areas were plastered 
with Palestinian flags; likewise, Unionist 
neighbourhoods were sporting Israeli flags.
Nigerian 
Christians 
engage in 
government 
funded 
pilgrimage to 
Israel.
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 M
U
S
A
 A
L
-S
H
A
E
R
 /
 ©
 A
F
P
, 
2
0
0
4
Maren Milligan is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government and Politics, University 
of Maryland. Her dissertation is on power-sharing regimes, group identity, and democratic 
transitions in Nigeria and Lebanon.
Email: mmilligan@gvpt.umd.edu 
